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Abstract: This paper critically discusses the "sharing economy", highlighting the 
conceptual ambiguity and the rhetorics that characterise this emerging phenomenon and 
the regulatory and policy disputes that have arisen around it. The paper considers both 
consumption oriented platforms and platforms intermediating labour and identify a number 
of rhetorical narratives that are then contrasted with the available empirical evidence. It 
shows that the debates on the sharing economy are characterised by value disputes, 
uncertain facts, high stakes and the need of urgent decision; despite the lack of robust 
evidence, rhetorical discourses are used by powerful concentrated interests for lobbying 
based on a convenient framing of the policy agenda. As decisions on regulation are taken 
or not taken in conditions of scientific uncertainty and under the framing implemented by 
concentrated interests, the paper argues that the approach of policy makers and 
regulators to the sharing economy exemplifies vividly the crisis of the Evidence Based 
Policy paradigm. 
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We are being afflicted with a new disease of which some readers may not yet have 
heard the name, but of which they will hear a great deal in the years to come--
namely, technological unemployment. This means unemployment due to our 
discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which 
we can find new uses for labour. 
John Maynard KEYNES, "Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren" (1930, p. 360)1 
                      
1 From John Maynard KEYNES, Essays in Persuasion, New York: W.W.Norton & Co., 1963 
(orig. ed. 1930), pp. 358-373. 
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he "online platform economy" has reached sizeable dimensions and 
today is very policy relevant and a hotly debated topic. A recent 
study commissioned by the European Commission (henceforth EC), 
for instance, has estimated that as many as almost 200m European 
citizens have used peer-to-peer platforms between May 2015 and May 2016 
(HAUSEMER et al., 2017). The platform economy is discussed both as a 
source of innovation/growth and as a matter of various policy concerns 
(competition, consumers' protection, privacy, algorithms transparency, etc.). 
According to an ad hoc issues of the Eurobarometer (European 
Commission, 2016c), many European citizens report to be concerned about 
consumers' rights and the lack of transparency on the way platforms 
function. In the Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy the EC announced an 
in depth review of platforms (European Commission, 2015a, 2015b), which 
translated in a number of initiatives including, among other things, the e-
commerce package2, the Communication on Online Platform (European 
Commission, 2016b), and the Communication on the Collaborative Economy 
(European Commission, 2016a); several European countries also took 
action in this domain3. The "sharing economy", or alternatively termed 
"collaborative economy", allegedly represents a specific segment of the 
online platform economy deserving a separate treatment; although we will 
show that such distinctiveness is very arguable at least from some of the 
platforms labelled as "sharing". One particular concern, that regards all 
online platforms but specifically those intermediating new forms of work, 
regards the alleged advent of technological unemployment predicted in the 
quotation from Keynes placed at the beginning of this article. The rise of 
online labour platforms, in fact, is occurring at the same time as many gurus 
predict the widespread computerisation and robotisation of jobs. 
                      
2 The e-commerce package contains, among other things, the legislative proposal 2016/0152 
(COD) on geo-blocking and the legislative proposal 2016/0148 (COD) concerning unfair 
commercial practices in the digital world. 
3 For instance:  
- a) In 2015, the French government promoted the Digital Republic Bill, with the objectives of 
opening up data and knowledge dissemination, ensuring equal rights for internet users, and 
promoting an inclusive digital society. 
http://www.republique-numerique.fr/pages/digital-republic-bill-rationale  
- b) In 2016, the Italian parliament drafted the Sharing Economy Act 
http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0039770.pdf  
- c) The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs commissioned a study to identify and evaluate 
policy options for online platforms 
https://www.tno.nl/en/about-tno/news/2016/3/how-policy-makers-can-deal-with-digital-platforms/ 
- d) In Germany, the Ministry of Economics has published a Green Book on Digital Platforms 
outlining rules and framework conditions for online platforms, while the Competition Authority 
has carried out an analysis of online market structures. 
T 
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At face value the "sharing economy" seemed a new and refreshing 
movement where social and public inspired passions could be reconciled 
with economic self-interest, exactly in the way that Albert HIRSCHMAN had 
argued (1977, 1982) in his attempt to rebuke the pessimism implicit in 
Mancur OLSON work on collective action (1971 [1965]). HIRSCHMAN 
challenged both those who saw the self as a utility-maximizing machine and 
the communitarian thinkers longing for a world without consumer avarice 
and the quest for lucre. In this view the passions and interests were 
counterpoints that integrated each other. Platforms born to share and also 
produce some utility seemed the realization of such vision. Yet, starting at 
least from 2014 these platforms have become the object of "sharing wars" 
(RAUCH & SCHLEICHER, 2015), where the passion of "true sharing" has 
been pitted against the "interests" of big commercial platforms. Most radical 
critiques argue that large platforms have hijacked the founding narrative of 
the sharing movement to pursue their own economic interests through 
traditional lobbying strategies (LEE, 2015; SCHOR, 2015; WALKER, 2015). 
Indeed, as we will argue taking inspiration from another seminal work by 
HIRSCHMAN (1991a), rhetorical framing is an essential part of the ongoing 
policy debates and conflicts surrounding the "sharing economy".  
Conceptual ambiguity and rhetorics surround the "sharing economy" and, 
in the midst of value disputes and lack of evidence, policy and regulatory 
decisions are taken "in the dark" often under the influence only of some 
interest groups; in many cases it seems that politicians and policy makers 
have abdicated to their role and are mute while courts and judges pronounce 
their judgements on whether Uber drivers are contractors or employees and 
on other matters. In this contest, one is led to wonder what has happened to 
the principles and goals of the Evidence Based Policy (henceforth EBP) 
paradigm. As a matter of fact, it is our claim, the "sharing economy" is one 
among the many policy domains that are bringing to the fore the intrinsic 
limitations and crisis of the crudely positivistic and technocratic nature of 
such a paradigm. The EBP was launched as part of the programme of New 
Labour in Blair's Britain (Cabinet Office, 1999), but rapidly spread beyond 
UK (NUTLEY et al., 2010); as noted (HEAD, 2013) p. 397, most policy 
makers adhered swiftly to the EBP mantra since policy making based on 
ignorance, opportunism, and vested interested is not "readily admitted". 
While there is hardly anything new in the programme of using evidence for 
policy (BOGLIACINO et al., 2015; MISURACA et al., 2013; PAWSON & 
TILLEY, 1997; VEDUNG, 2010), the main peculiarity of the EBP paradigm is 
its unrealistic ambition to eliminate any ideological element and judgements 
from the formulation of policies, and to curb the discretion of professionals 
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(i.e. teachers, field workers, policy officers, etc.). Indeed, it has been 
criticised as a sort of new "rationality project" to expel politics from policy 
making that consider democratic processes as rent-seeking and a 
deadweight loss to society (KAY, 2011). Increasing criticisms to EBP include 
authors turning it on its head and arguing that what is happening in practice 
is "Policy Based Evidence Making" (PBEM) as a form of misuse of evidence 
in policy making (SANDERSON, 2011; STRASSHEIM & KETTUNEN, 2014; 
TORRITI, 2010). The EBP paradigm has been under serious reconsideration 
also within the European Commission not least for the controversy that has 
surrounded first the establishment and then the discontinuation of the post of 
Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA)4. 
This paper, selectively drawing on various analyses presented 
elsewhere5, discusses the "'sharing economy" and the regulatory and policy 
disputes surrounding it, as a case in point in the crisis and limits of the EBP 
paradigm. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework, whereas Section 3 
illustrates the main rhetorical dimensions in the framing of this phenomenon, 
and selectively confronts them against available empirical evidence. Section 
4 briefly presents the regulatory debates surrounding the sharing economy, 
discusses their implications with respect to the EBP paradigm, and 
concludes. 
  Theoretical framework: the policy triangle and the 
importance of framing 
There is plethora of ways in which various authors have tried to 
characterise the different possibilities in which the relation between science 
and policy has been or could be articulated (BEST & HOLMES, 2010; 
                      
4 Recently a collection of essays focused on the future of science advice in Europe ((WILSDON 
& DOUBLEDAY, 2015) contains interesting contributions both directly from the Commission 
(MADELIN, 2015), from the JRC (ŠUCHA et al., 2015), as well as two pieces from the former 
CSA Ann GLOVER (GLOVER, 2015; GLOVER & MÜLLER, 2015). 
5 First, we refer to the two monographies published by the JRC on the sharing economy in 
general (CODAGNONE et al., 2016b) and on online labour platforms (CODAGNONE et al., 
2016a); these two reports are based on systematic reviews of hundreds of literature sources 
and of more than 100 hundred "sharing" platforms (with analysis of their business model, as 
well as of self-presentations, and self-reported economic impacts). In this article we only 
selectively report and analyse some of the sources documented in these two monographies. In 
addition, we draw on a forthcoming book (CODAGNONE et al. 2017) focusing on the crisis of, 
and on alternatives to, the EBP paradigm. 
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PIELKE, 2007; PREGERNIG, 2014; YOUNG et al., 2002). The linear model 
versus the stakeholder model (i.e., PIELKE 2007, p. 76), the "demarcation 
model" as a way for protecting science from political interference, the 
communication theory of ineffective transfers where problems are seen as a 
matter of different languages (i.e. PREGERNIG, 2014), civic science and 
democratisation of expertise, and many more. That policy can be entirely 
determined by evidence it is the naïve and technocratic tenet of the EBP 
paradigm. We see, in fact, policy as shaped by the interaction between the 
three dimensions of the figure below: evidence, interest groups' politics, and 
values. 
Figure 1 - The policy triangle 
 
We describe the above policy triangle briefly and in stylised fashion for 
our purpose here is mainly to discuss the role of framing within the 
interaction between policy makers and interest groups. The evidence 
dimension concerns science and scientists and how they influence, or are 
influenced by, policy making debates and the values of the surrounding 
society (see for instance PIELKE, 2007). The values dimension, with its 
underlying emotionally shaped system of belief6, in a stylised fashion refers 
                      
6 It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into in depth social psychological discussion of 
the concept of values and we limit ourselves here to follow the definition provided by 
THORNGATE (2001, pp. 88-91). An attitude is an attraction/repulsion to/from a thing, idea, 
concept, person, which is called the attitude object (i.e. a policy or ATO,). The 
attraction/repulsion is felt as an emotion. The degree of attraction/repulsion is called a value. 
When we say that a policy has a value it means we have an emotional reaction to it, or an 
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to society and the citizenry at large. The dimension of politics has to do both 
with organised interests and policy makers, and we concentrate on it in the 
following discussion. 
The political dimension of policy making involves also the policy making 
bodies and the policy makers, because it would be naïve to take for granted 
that policies are enacted only for the public interest and that evidence is 
used in policy making only for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness. 
Policy makers have their own agenda and goals, as well as their values7. 
They interact with concentrated specific interests (i.e. industry) and diffuse 
interests (i.e. consumers). This is a classical distinction following Mancur 
OLSON'S theory of collective action (OLSON, 1971 [1965]); OLSON 
deemed diffuse interests as the "forgotten groups" and took consumers as a 
typifying example of a numerous but dispersed group that "have no 
organization to countervail the power of organized or monopolistic 
producers" (OLSON, 1971 [1965], p. 166). According to an extensive review 
of interest groups' politics (BEYERS et al., 2008, p. 1109), the distinction 
between specific and diffuse interests remains quite influential but it is rather 
an empirical question to be tested. BOUWEN, analysing of the multitude of 
access opportunities used by groups to exert influence in the EU's multi-
level, stresses the importance for such groups to provide EU institutions (i.e. 
Commission, Council, and Parliament) with the "access goods" (basically 
                      
attitude. Often we have a set of emotional reactions that can be combined into an overall 
attitude. Each item in this set, however, reflects a link between our emotion and our belief. 
7 According to classical Public Interest Theory, policy pursues common and public goods, and 
addresses market failures. As first advanced by PIGOU (PIGOU, 1920; PIGOU, 1932), 
regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction of inefficient or 
inequitable market practices. Regulation is assumed initially to benefit society as a whole rather 
than particular vested interests. The rival of Public Interest Theory has been called the "Capture 
Theory" (POSNER, 1974) or alternatively the "Chicago Theory" (HANTKE-DOMAS, 2003, 
p. 165). The first contribution in the construction of this rival approach came by George 
STIGLER (1971), who wrote about the influence of interest groups in designing and enforcing 
regulation, arguing that regulatory agencies may be "captured" by special interests. From an 
organizational and institutional perspective, it has also been shown that policy making bodies as 
any other organization do not pursue only instrumental goals but also their own survival and 
legitimacy (DIMAGGIO & POWELL, 1991; DIMAGGIO & POWELL, 1983; SELZNICK, 1948, 
1949; WEBER, 1970, pp. 220-222). Finally, in a ground breaking and neglected social 
psychological analysis of the role of policy analysis, THORNGATE (2001) sheds light on the 
social-psychological deviations from instrumental rationality in policy-making. His main 
argument is that policy makers decide to make or improve policies, not only for the intrinsic 
merits of the policy at stake, but also for competition with peers, to get promotion or avoid 
demotion, for the desire to save face and that often Policy making is ridden with social influence 
and group dynamics distortion (i.e. normative conformance to avoid embarrassment, censure, 
or ostracism, and group processes such as group think bias). 
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information)8 that they demand (2002, 2004); a corollary of these findings 
would be that specific and concentrated interests (be they association or 
single firms) have a better capacity to access and/or buy the evidence to be 
provided to such institution. In this respect it is worth noting that firms 
increasingly lobby Brussels directly without going through national or pan-
national sectorial associations (BERNHAGEN & MITCHELL, 2009). 
It is in such context that the issue of rhetorical framing acquires 
importance as an instrument within the interest groups politics, and brings us 
back to HIRSCHMAN. Throughout his scientific production, HIRSCHMAN 
considered ideas, values, and rhetorical discourses as having autonomous 
effects on the process of change itself, regardless of whether or not they are 
empirically grounded. He considered them part of the endogenous 
mechanisms of social and economic change with an approach that can be 
deemed "pragmatic idealism" (ADELMAN, 2013, p. 422). In his last book 
The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (1991b), he applied 
such perspective with its main concerns being the role of discourse in 
democracy. He observed how opposing groups in liberal democracies 
sometimes get walled off from each other's opinions and views; rhetorical 
discourses can explode into conflict simply as a result of the 'imperative of 
the argument'. Rhetorical discourses limit what people might consider as 
alternatives and are immune from being wrong and accommodate 
uncertainty. He found a detached analysis of surface rhetoric, placed 
historically and analytically in context, more useful than a head-on attack on 
one of the opposing factions, and claimed that deconstructing rhetoric by 
using empirical evidence could help restore dialogue and communication 
between conflicting factions.  
Rhetorics are part and parcel of debates on important policy issues that 
involved opposing interests entering into various forms of negotiations that 
can be settled or become intractable. Rhetorical discourse is also an 
instrument of framing policy agenda and debates.  
TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN (1981) have shown that framing can affect the 
choice one makes in any given choice problems, that is to say that framing 
the exact same choice in a different manner can radically change the choice 
                      
8 BOUWEN defines access goods as "goods provided by private actors to the EU institutions in 
order to gain access. Each access good concerns a specific kind of information that is important 
in the EU decision-making process. The criticality of an access good for the functioning of an 
EU institution determines the degree of access that the institution will grant to the private 
interest representatives” (2002: 370). 
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actors make. So, a framing strategy can be used by players on both sides of 
a policy contested issue to polarise the situation. Much before that the role of 
ideas and the framing perspective was taken up in studies of politics and 
policy making, it was adopted in the sociological analysis of social 
movements (BENFORD & SNOW, 2000; KLANDERMANS, 1997; SNOW & 
BENFORD, 1988; SNOW et al., 1986). Frame alignment, bridging, and 
amplification, are processes of strategic importance in the mobilisation of 
social movements (SNOW & BENFORD, 1988; SNOW et al., 1986). Frame 
alignment occurs when individual frames are linked and made congruent 
and, thus, produce "frame resonance" and catalyse the group formation 
process. Frame bridging involves the "linkage of two or more ideologically 
congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue 
or problem"' (SNOW et al., 1986, p. 467). Frame amplification refers to "the 
clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a 
particular issue, problem, or set of events" (SNOW et al., 1986, p. 469). 
Through the value amplification logic, framers can actively promote and 
embellish a specific value to justify the actions proposed in its name. "Value 
amplification refers to the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or 
more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not 
inspired collective action for any number of reasons" (SNOW et al. 1986: 
469). Framing, thus, is at the centre of the social construction of collective 
action frames creating an interface between media discourses and 
interpersonal interaction; they produce persuasive communication during 
mobilization campaigns by movement organisations, their opponents and 
countermovement organisations (KLANDERMANS, 1997). Following these 
insights, in the last two decades the framing perspective and the role of 
ideas have increasingly been applied both theoretically and empirically in the 
study of both politics and policy making. According to BÉLAND (2009), 
framing affects the policy making process in three ways: a) constructing the 
issues entering the agenda; b) shaping the assumptions that affect the 
content of policy proposals; and c) it may build discursive weapons in the 
construction of reforms imperatives. Particularly important is the role of 
framing in shaping policy assumptions, as they form what HALL calls "policy 
paradigms" (1993).  
Therefore, in our policy triangle framework the rhetorical framing of 
discourse also by way of producing and disseminating "evidence" can be 
considered a strategy weapon of lobbying especially by concentrated 
interests in an attempt to shape the policy agenda and contents in ways that 
are favourable to them or at least to contain the potential damage that may 
derive from regulatory intervention. As we show in the reminding of this 
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paper, rhetorical framing has been a key weapon used by the most 
concentrated and powerful economic interests active in the sharing economy 
policy and regulatory arena. 
  The rhetorical framing of the sharing economy 
The "sharing economy" has been deemed as "floating signifier" for a 
diverse range of activities (NADEEM, 2015, p. 13) and its usage to refer to 
various commercial platforms the "triumph of public relations artistry" 
(TAYLOR, 2015). The matter of the fact is that the ambiguity of the term is 
such that at times one is left to wonder whether stakeholders, experts, and 
policy makers are talking about the same phenomenon. As discussed by 
BELK (BELK, 2014), among all the platforms included in the sharing 
economy one could distinguish "real sharing" from "pseudo sharing", by 
which he means "business relationship masquerading as communal 
sharing". Such conceptual ambiguity goes hand in hand with rhetorical 
narratives that have been harnessed into current disputes between boosters 
promising "utopian outcomes" (empower consumers, lower carbon footprint, 
and efficiency) and the critics denouncing that self-defined sharing 
companies are in reality about economic self-interest pursued in predatory 
and exploitative manners (SCHOR, 2014, p. 1).  
The roots of such rhetorical framing can be found in the optimism that 
accompanied the initial phase of the "crowds" and "sharing" phenomena. 
First came the optimism on crowdsourcing and of the "wisdom of crowds" 
(ANDERSON, 2006; BENKLER, 2004, 2006; BENKLER & NISSENBAUM, 
2006; SUROWIECKI, 2004) allegedly offering a "cognitive surplus" 
(SHIRKY, 2010) and problem solving capabilities (BRABHAM, 2013; 
BRABHAM, 2008; GEHL, 2011) and promising new efficiencies efficiency 
(CHANDLER & KAPELNER, 2013; DJELASSI & DECOOPMAN, 2013; 
SATZGER et al., 2013). Then came the social optimism on the sharing 
movement portrayed as offering triple wins: greener commerce, greater 
profits, and rich social experiences in the form of community revival and 
strengthening of social capital (GRASSMUCK, 2012; LEADBEATER, 2009; 
O'REGAN, 2009; WITTEL, 2011). Later on, management (GUTTENTAG, 
2013; HEIMANS & TIMMS, 2014; MATZLER & KATHAN, 2015; WEF, 2013, 
2014; WOSSKOW, 2014) and neo-liberal economics optimistic narratives 
followed (ALLEN & BERG, 2014; COHEN & SUNDARARAJAN, 2015; 
KOOPMAN et al., 2014, 2015; SUNDARARAJAN, 2014; THIERER et al., 
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2015). Management gurus (HEIMANS & TIMMS, 2014), for instance, 
proposed a distinction between "new power" (sharing economy, but also 
grass-roots political movements) and "old power" (big corporations, but also 
established political parties) where the former is about radical transparency, 
openness and collaboration and the latter about bureaucracy. Neo-liberal 
and libertarian economists expect the "sharing" platforms to: a) increase 
economic activities and productivity through better use of underutilised 
assets or "dead capital", and through lowering transaction costs that expand 
trade; b) increase social utility and consumer welfare as a result of more 
competition; c) create new jobs; d) reduce information asymmetry between 
consumers and producers thanks to reputational ratings; e) create new 
markets through disruptive innovations and spur in turn further innovation 
among incumbent industries; f) produce a new cohort of entrepreneurs if the 
micro-entrepreneurs who provide services in the platforms acquire the 
experience and skills to progress and launch their own ventures.  
From several analyses of the sharing rhetoric (CODAGNONE et al., 
2016b; COHEN & MUÑOZ, 2015; DREDGE & GYIMÓTHY, 2015; MARTIN, 
2016) the following themes emerge on the promises of the sharing economy 
in general: a) revival of community and increase in social capital; b) more 
equitable distributional effects; c) positive environmental and economic 
impacts; d) disruptive innovations. With regards to online platforms 
intermediating labour there are at least three specific rhetorical discourses 
(see more in CODAGNONE et al. 2016a). First, the rhetoric of a flat world 
allowing digital labour migration with no boundaries. Second, the discourse 
on extra-money as a motivation to work for the flexers (students, retirees, 
stay at home parents, etc.); As acutely observed by BERG (2016, p. 18), the 
claim about individuals working in digital labour markets for "pin money" or 
out of boredom is a replication of the rhetoric used in the late 1950s and in 
the 1960s when the new temporary agency industry in the US was portrayed 
as employing just middle class wives killing time and earning extra-money. 
This is an emblematic case of HIRSCHMAN'S claim that rhetorical 
discourses of the past tend to resurface. Third, the alleged contribution of 
online labour platform to bring back to work the unemployed and under 
employed. Fourth, the discourse on the flexibility, autonomy, and creativity 
that these platforms allegedly provide to their workers. 
CANNON & SUMMERS (2014) wrote a piece providing strategic 
suggestions for Uber and other "sharing economy" companies on how to 
fence current criticisms and win over "regulators" by using state of the art 
techniques to reach out to government, produce well researched cases 
showing the benefits created by companies, use external validators, and 
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create coalitions. Indeed, all the major commercial sharing platforms have 
just done exactly as suggested. The narrative of their blogs is clearly framed 
in terms of sharing and caring and they have produced several self-reports 
on the many economic and social impacts they allegedly deliver to economy 
and society (see CODAGNONE et al. 2016a; 2016b). For reason of space 
just a few examples are reported here. In a public hearing with the UK 
House of Lords Patrick ROBINSON (Head of Public Policy Europe and 
Canada for Airbnb) affirmed that "In our case, the public interest at stake 
here is, first, about consumers and consumer choice not just to consume 
services but to be producers of services too. The additional income that 
Airbnb hosts are making is very important to them. Identifying outdated rules 
and regulations that might stop people engaging in what is beneficial activity 
is a good exercise and one that I am delighted that we undertook in 
London…" (House of Lords, 2016). The rhetoric of a flat world is integrated 
with that of the advent of a global online meritocracy by the Elance-oDesk 
(then renamed Upwork) 2014 annual impact report (Elance-oDesk, 2014). 
Last but not least, On 10 February 2016, Airbnb, Uber and 45 other 
commercial "sharing" platforms sent an open letter to the Netherlands 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union9, where they demanded to 
be protected from regulatory intervention taken at national and local level in 
in view of their great contribution to sustainable economic growth in Europe. 
Not surprisingly, several observers have claimed that large companies have 
co-opted the sharing movement to pursue economic self-interest through 
traditional lobbying strategies (LEE, 2015; SCHOR, 2015; WALKER, 2015). 
According to LEE (2015, p. 17), the "sharing economy" is just another 
example of how "insurgent sentiments" are used to "sell the bona fide of 
profit-making corporations". The anti-establishment ideology disseminated 
by magazine Sharable and association Peer.org are increasingly seen as 
mouthpiece of big companies such as Uber and Airbnb that use such 
rhetorical weaponry for the pursuit of their economic interests (KERR, 2014). 
As a matter of fact, it is our claim that the sharing economy is a unique case 
in which concentrated and specific economic interests (large commercial 
platforms) not only have used to their advantage the narratives describing 
the initial phase of the sharing movement, but they have also succeeded in 
the infrequent objective of enlisting diffuse (i.e. consumers) interests as their 
allies.  
                      
9 https://www.airbnbaction.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/NLCouncilLetterCollabEcon-Final-
100216-4.pdf (retrieved 9-10-2017). 
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We have fully discussed and proposed a way to use rhetorically free 
definitions and taxonomies in the two earlier cited monographic works 
(CODAGNONE et al. 2016a; 2016b) and below we limit ourselves to just a 
very brief conceptual discussion. The expression sharing economy is used 
to indicate "a wide range of digital commercial or non-profit platforms 
facilitating exchanges amongst a variety of players through a variety of 
interaction modalities (P2P, P2B, B2P, B2B, G2G) that all broadly enable 
consumption or productive activities leveraging capital assets (money, real 
estate property, equipment, cars, etc.) goods, skills, or just time" 
(CODAGNONE et al. 2016b, p. 22). From this meta-definition the typology 
below can be extracted that is a useful heuristic tool to make some broad 
distinctions. 
Figure 2 - Broad typology of "sharing platforms" 
 
Source: CODAGNONE et al. (2016b, p. 23) 
The core type identified is represented by the platforms in Quadrant 3 
(including those that are placed in the hybridisation box as they involve also 
P2B and not only P2P interactions). These are Commercial peer-to-peer 
(P2P) or peer-to-business (P2B) platforms such as Uber, Airbnb, 
TaskRabbit, Upwork. They have a large user base, raise short-term 
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regulatory concerns (market access, taxation, consumer protection and 
liability, and labour law), and the largest players disrupt incumbent industries 
and trigger their protest. 
It is our claim that large commercial "sharing" platforms are just two-sided 
markets like most other platforms that are not considered part of the sharing 
economy and function along the same principles described in the economic 
literature on two-sided and multi-sided markets10. Those platforms matching 
providers of work based services with requested (something missing here?) 
should just be defined as two sided online labour markets: (1) that work as 
digital marketplaces for non-standard and contingent work; (2) where 
services of various nature are produced using preponderantly the labour 
factor (as opposed to selling goods or renting property or a car); (3) where 
labour (i.e. the produced services) is exchanged for money; (4) where the 
matching is digitally mediated and administered although performance and 
delivery of labour can be electronically transmitted or be physical; (5) where 
the allocation of labour and money is determined by a collection of buyers 
and sellers operating within a price system that (CODAGNONE et al. 2016a, 
p. 17), we favour dispensing with rhetorically loaded labels and prefer the 
expression "market" to "platform" as the latter is surrounded by a politically 
motivated rhetoric (GILLESPIE, 2010) matched by that on the objectivity of 
the algorithms they use (GILLESPIE, 2014). 
On the claim that an individual joins the "sharing economy" mainly with 
socially oriented goods and that sharing platforms revive community and 
strengthen trust and social capital there is quite some evidence that, 
although not conclusive, it helps bring some realistic appraisal (ALBINSSON 
& YASANTHI PERERA, 2012; ARSEL & DOBSHA, 2011; BARDHI & 
                      
10 Since 2002, a growing body of mostly conceptual-theoretical economic literature has 
analysed situations where one economic operator (originally referred to as an intermediary and 
later increasingly as a platform) brings together at least two different groups of users as 
instances of "two-sided" or "multisided" (when there are more than two groups) markets. 
Though they did not use the expression "two-sided markets", the first to look at firms serving 
two different types of customers and facing the "chicken and egg problem" were GAWER & 
CUSUMANO (2002) and CAILLAUD & JULIEN (2003). These authors referred to "intermediary 
markets" serving two distinct groups of customers. The expression "two-sided market" was first 
introduced by ROCHET & TIROLE (ROCHET & TIROLE, 2003, 2006) and was used later by 
WRIGHT (2004) and ARMSTRONG (2006) In parallel, EVANS used the expression "two-sided 
platforms" (EVANS, 2003a, 2003b) and was one of the first to systematically apply this 
perspective to what he called the web economy (EVANS, 2008a, 2008b, 2009). On the other 
hand, PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE (PARKER & VAN ALSTYNE, 2000; PARKER & ALSTYNE, 
2005) were converging on "two-sidedness" coming from network and information theory, and 
with EISENMANN were the first to talk about two-sided "strategies" rather than "markets" 
(EISENMANN et al., 2006). 
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ECKHARDT, 2012; DUBOIS et al., 2014; LAMBERTON & ROSE, 2012; 
MARTIN & UPHAM, 2015; MÖHLMANN, 2015; OZANNE & BALLANTINE, 
2010; PARIGI & STATE, 2014; PARIGI et al., 2013). Whereas traces of 
social motivations and community orientation can be found, the evidence 
helps us go beyond the polarised rhetoric and controversies and shows that 
at most the sharing economy is a mix of "passions' and 'interests". First, 
individuals join the "sharing economy" both for altruism and in pursuit of 
utilitarian goals; anti-capitalist and anti-consumption ideologies and 
sentiments can be found as motivations but are not the norm. Second, 
sharing platforms create some form of genuine social capital but one can 
find also reciprocal, even negative at times, exchanges. Third, altruistic and 
ideological motivations and social capital building seem clearly to 
characterise more the early not-for-profit initiatives.  
While environmental impacts are prominently heralded in platforms self-
promotion there is hardly any robust evidence about them (CODAGNONE et 
al. 2016b, p. 41). Actually, very intuitive theoretical reasoning suggests that 
such impact, if any, is more than counterbalanced by the increase in 
consumption that platforms generate. Airbnb to demonstrate its impacts on 
city economies provides "evidence" that its guests spend more than 
traditional tourists, which is self-defeating with respect to the claim that it 
produces environmental benefits. On other economic and social impact such 
as consumer welfare, more equitable distributional effects, reduction of car 
accidents as a result of drinking and driving (claimed by Uber) the evidence 
is very limited and inconclusive (BENJAAFAR et al., 2015; FRAIBERGER & 
SUNDARARAJAN, 2015; GREENWOOD & WATTAL, 2015; HORTON & 
ZECKHAUSER, 2016; WALLSTEN, 2015). The most robust evidence based 
on counterfactual methodologies document the negative impacts that Airbnb 
has on the hotel industry (ZERVAS et al., 2014), depressing revenues and 
reducing employment (FANG et al., 2015). 
Individuals join online labour platforms to integrate their income or for 
making a living and not for "pin money" (KAUFMANN et al., 2011; PILZ & 
GEWALD, 2013; ROSS et al., 2010) (IRANI & SILBERMAN, 2013; MARTIN 
et al., 2014; SILBERMAN & IRANI, 2016) TEODORO et al. (2014), and it is 
not the "generosity of cognitive surplus" but rather monotonous work done 
for money that characterises the digital matching for the completion of micro 
tasks (MARTIN et al., 2014). Actually, there is evidence that for some 
"contractors" online labour platforms are the main source of income (BERG, 
2016; University of Hertfordshire & UNI Europa, 2016). There is no empirical 
evidence that such platforms are increasing the labour participation of the 
unemployed and under employed (CODAGNONE et al. 2016a, p. 40). The 
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most robust empirical evidence based on experiments and quasi-
experimental methods demonstrated that there is not yet a flat world and 
such labour markets are not an online meritocracy for they are still 
characterised by frictions, hiring inefficiencies, and biases (CODAGNONE et 
al. 2016a, pp. 44-46). Finally, there is no unequivocal evidence that these 
markets favour a democratising "long tail" of employment opportunities 
(AGRAWAL et al., 2013) and there are actually several contributions 
documenting "super star effects" (HORTON, 2014; MILL, 2011; MUSTHAG 
& GANESAN, 2013), which means that in several platforms 20% of the 
workers get 80% of the jobs offered. If confirmed by further studies, this 
would imply more inequality rather than equalising effects.  
In sum, the available empirical evidence not only is inconclusive to 
support policy and regulatory decisions, but wherever it is at least robust 
enough it debunks most of the rhetoric and myths surrounding the "sharing 
economy". But what is most important to stress is that under the current 
condition of uncertainty (lack of evidence), it is not possible to weigh the 
benefits of the sharing economy against its possible social costs (i.e. 
regulatory arbitrage from lack of legislation, negative employment impacts 
for incumbent industries, future social costs to be borne by the public budget 
for those working in online platforms with no form of social protection and 
health insurance). 
  Discussion and conclusions 
The debate on regulating the consumer oriented segment of the sharing 
economy is polarised between those against intervention and in favour of 
laissez-faire and self-regulation ((ALLEN & BERG, 2014; COHEN & 
SUNDARARAJAN, 2015; KOOPMAN et al., 2014, 2015; SUNDARARAJAN, 
2014; THIERER et al., 2015) and those supporting at least some form of 
regulation (CANNON & CHUNG, 2015; EDELMAN & GERADIN, 2015; 
RANCHORDAS, 2015; RAUCH & SCHLEICHER, 2015; SUNIL & NOAH, 
2015). The libertarian solution uses the weaponry of text-book economics 
about the failures of regulation and the self-regulatory nature of markets and 
stresses the risk of regulatory capture of regulators by incumbent industries. 
As a matter of fact, so far regulators have been captured relatively more by 
the skilful rhetorical framing used by large platforms as a lobbying weapon, 
at least judging by the very limited regulation introduced so far in European 
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Countries and by the very general and quite loose prescriptions contained in 
the European Commission communication on the collaborative economy.  
The same kind of polarization can be found for what concerns the 
regulation of online labour platforms (CHERRY & ALOISI, 2016; DE 
STEFANO, 2016; DOKKO et al., 2015; HAGIU, 2015; HAGIU & 
BIEDERMAN, 2015; HARRIS & KRUEGER, 2015; HILL, 2015; PRASSL & 
RISAK, 2016), which has been aggravated by the various legal disputes that 
have engaged judgement to decide whether the individuals providing their 
labour based services should be considered independent contractors or 
employees (CODAGNONE et al. 2016b, pp. 46-51). In October 2016, a UK 
employment tribunal dismissed the notion that Uber merely coordinates self-
employed workers11. According to the judgement, it would be impossible for 
workers to grow their businesses through Uber unless "growing their 
business simply means spending more hours at the wheel". The ruling said: 
"The notion that Uber in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small businesses 
linked by a common "platform" is to our mind faintly ridiculous". Yet, the 
controversies on the status of online labour platforms "contractors/workers" 
continue, whereas on the matter of their social protection several proposals 
have emerged. Crowd workers, especially those engaging in multi-jobbing 
share with other non-standard workers in contractual arrangements with 
multiple parties the difficulty to identify who is their "employer" for collective 
bargaining or compliance with health and safety obligations (PRASSL & 
RISAK, 2016). Also, if they cannot connect the various employers they are 
excluded by various forms of social protection (ADAMS & DEAKIN, 2014a, 
2014b). For this purpose, some have proposed the portability of social 
contributions and also of reputational ratings across platforms (HILL, 2015), 
or to create a new category of workers subject to certain regulations, and 
whose employers would be responsible for some costs (like, say, 
reimbursement of expenses and workers' compensation) but not others (like 
Social Security and Medicare taxes (HARRIS & KRUEGER, 2015; HAGIU & 
BIEDERMAN, 2015). This solution, however, has several drawbacks as 
illustrated by DE STEFANO (2016, pp. 18-21). Creating an intermediate 
category of worker such as dependent contractors or dependent self-
employed persons implies to identify suitable definitions, which would simply 
change the object of controversies. In the meantime, neither in Europe nor in 
the US have policy or regulatory decisions on these matters been taken. The 
                      
11 Courts and Tribunals Judiciary _ Mr Y. ASLAM, Mr J. FARRAR and Others -vs- Uber. 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/mr-y-aslam-mr-j-farrar-and-others-v-uber/ (retrieved 15 
June 2017). 
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key policy question remains as to whether or not there is a need for 
regulatory intervention, which immediately gives rise to a second one: what 
would the costs and benefits of regulation be? To answer this question one 
would need to have empirical evidence on the current net welfare effects of 
"sharing' activities and then calculate how this would change after regulation 
is introduced. As the former is unavailable (see the previous paragraph), the 
latter is obviously not feasible. Yet, in the face of policy inaction platforms 
can profit from regulatory arbitrage.  
This article has amply documented the fact that the "sharing economy" is 
currently characterized by conflicting rhetoric and controversies between 
disputed values and interests. Neutral empirical evidence is currently limited, 
which creates an opportunity for concentrated interests to lobbying by 
framing the policy debate also with the evidence they can produce. 
Platforms produce quantitative evidence using their own data, to which only 
"embedded researchers" (i.e. researchers who are employed by platforms 
and have been given access to internal data) have access. The datasets 
and methods used to produce these reports, thus, are not publicly 
accessible for third-party scrutiny, but nonetheless such self-interested 
reports represent an "access good" to influence policy makers. The "sharing 
economy" epitomises the conditions of Post-Normal science: facts are 
uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent 
(FUNTOWICZ & RAVETZ, 1991). Under such conditions the EBP paradigm 
or any other approach envisaging a linear relation between science and 
policy are naïve or, worse, a shortcut to depoliticise policy making that 
favours concentrated interests such as those of large commercial "sharing" 
platforms.  
Besides requiring more transparent approaches to policy making, tackling 
the regulatory open issues would also require a new stream of empirical 
research efforts. Whereas such efforts could not promise to solve all the 
conflicts and controversies following a pure "technocratic" model, they could, 
nonetheless, more "realistically" and "humbly" reduce the current value-
loadedness12 that characterises policy debates. 
 
 
                      
12 The reference here is the Max WEBER’S distinction between ‘value-freedom’ (Wertfreiheit) 
and ‘value-relevance’ (Wertbeziehung) with respect to three phases of research: what we 
research, how we do it, and how results are interpreted (WEBER, 1904). 
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